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Judge Damon Keith: The Judicial Antidote to Judge
Julius Hoffman
Challenging Claims of Unilateral Executive
Authority
Ellen Yaroshefsky*
From some of the highly-publicized trials of the 1960s—namely the trials
of the Chicago Eight, Panther Twenty-One, and Weathermen—we can draw
indispensable lessons about the role of the judges in upholding and
promoting a fair justice system. The contrast to Judge Julius Hoffman’s
notorious injudicious conduct in the Chicago Eight case is the courageous,
thoughtful Judge Damon Keith, in the less publicized White Panther case in
Detroit in the early 1970s. Judge Keith’s overriding sense of fairness
exemplified the best of judicial independence in considering President
Nixon’s claims of unilateral executive authority in United States v. Ayers
and United States v. U.S. District Court. Judge Keith’s exemplary judicial
conduct is an embrace of judicial independence that provides inspiration in
current times.
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INTRODUCTION
Judge Julius Hoffman, the infamous, irascible judge in the 1970
Chicago Eight case, is the iconic representation of much that can go
wrong in a courtroom. Quick-tempered and exhibiting a lack of
fundamental respect for lawyers and litigants who, in turn, disrespected
his authority, Hoffman presided over a trial that was aptly described as a
circus. This notorious disorderly trial of eight Vietnam antiwar activists
indicted for conspiring, organizing, and inciting riots during the
Democratic National Convention, went awry from its beginning. Before
the trial began, four of the original lawyers indicated that they would
withdraw from the case; Judge Hoffman issued bench warrants for the
arrest of those lawyers.1 Then the judge refused to postpone the trial until
Charles Garry, lawyer for defendant Bobby Seale, recovered from a gall
bladder operation. The confrontations continued throughout, and the
actions and antics of the defendants in the courtroom were met with fortyseven contempt citations during that early phase and ultimately 175
contempt citations against the defendants and two of their lawyers.2 The
judge ordered Bobby Seale gagged and bound. William Kunstler, one of
the defense lawyers said “This is no longer a court of order, your Honor,
this a medieval torture chamber. It is a disgrace. They are assaulting the
other defendants also.”3 Ultimately, the case was reversed on appeal, and
the Circuit court criticized Judge Hoffman for cumulative prejudicial
remarks and the prosecution for inflammatory statements.4 There was
little question that Judge Hoffman’s conduct was outside the bounds of a
reasonable jurist.

1. Upon protest from law professors and groups of lawyers, the judge vacated the order.
NORMAN DORSEN & LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT 56
(1973).
2. CONTEMPT: TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF
THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10, at xviii, 9 (1970). This number includes the contempt citations
against Bobby Seale, who was later severed from the case, causing the Chicago Eight to become
the Chicago Seven. William W. Farrell, The Chicago 7, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/04/archives/once-more-with-decorum-the-chicago-7.html.
3. Id. at 27. Ultimately, the case was reversed and sent back for retrial before a different judge.
The government chose not to reprosecute because it did not want to reveal wiretaps against Bobby
Seale. The contempt citations against Weinglass and Kunstler for actions such as refusing to sit
down immediately after being ordered to do so, for making legal arguments after the judge had
ruled on such matters, for cross examination beyond the scope of direct, and for making “invidious
comparison[s] between the treatment the court afforded the witnesses called by the defendant as
opposed to the treatment afforded witnesses called by the government” were reversed on appeal.
See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1972).
4. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 386–91 (7th Cir. 1972).
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I. THE 1960S AND CASES AGAINST POLITICAL RADICALS
A. The Panther Twenty-One
This was not the only infamous highly publicized case that focused on
1960s political radicals presided over by a judge who lost control of his
courtroom.5 The Panther Twenty-One case in New York is the second
case of the era that led to handwringing by the bar and bench. On April
2, 1969, twenty-one Black Panther members were indicted and charged
with conspiracy to kill several police officers and to destroy a number of
police stations, department stores, the Bronx Botanical Gardens, and
other buildings.6
The case was assigned to Judge John M. Murtagh who had been
handpicked by the Manhattan District Attorney, Frank Hogan. 7 His
biases against the defendants and defense lawyers were evident from the
case’s inception. The defendants consistently challenged the court’s
authority, its unfair rulings, and other conduct. Virtually from the day that
Hogan picked Murtagh, as Lefcourt noted, it was an
all-out war once we knew how he had been selected. During pretrial
hearings, the judge and the defense were at each other’s throats. The
government got daily copy of the transcripts from the day’s
proceedings, and we could not afford it. The court denied us a copy. It
permitted the press to take up all the front rows thereby creating no
room for the family of the defendants. There was an uproar. A daily
uproar.8

The judge decided to discontinue the pretrial proceedings until the
defendants told him they “consented to a trial conducted under the
5. Interview with Gerald Lefcourt (Apr. 30, 2018) (notes on file with author); see generally
DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1.
6. The Panther 21: To Judge Murtagh, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE 185, 185 (Robert Lefcourt
ed., 1971) [hereinafter To Judge Murtaugh]. “The Black Panthers, also known as Black Panther
Party, was a political organization founded in 1966 by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale to challenge
police brutality against the African American community.” They instituted multiple social
programs, including the popular program that provided free breakfast for school children, and
participated in political activities. They garnered extensive support in urban centers with large
African American communities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia.
Nationally, The Black Panthers had roughly 2,000 members by 1968. Black Panthers, HISTORY
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/black-panthers.
7. In that era, “Mr. Hogan rather frequently pick[ed] his judges.” MURRAY KEMPTON, THE
BRIAR PATCH 27 (Da Capo Press 1997) (1973). Haywood Burns, one of the defense counsel, sought
to challenge Hogan’s handpicking Murtagh. Lefcourt, supra note 5; see also generally United
States ex rel. Shakur v. Comm’r of Corr., 303 F. Supp. 303, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing
Transcript of argument before Justice Murtagh at 8, People v. Shakur, No. 1848-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 5, 1969)). Gerald Lefcourt notes that one of the changes resulting from this case was that Chief
Judge Judith Kaye changed the practice in New York to preclude such handpicked judges. Lefcourt,
supra note 5.
8. Lefcourt, supra note 5.
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‘American system of criminal justice.’”9 The defendants, who were
unwilling to give such a statement of consent because, as they stated, it is
the “Amerikan system of criminal justice” that we cannot abide,10 wrote
a lengthy letter to the judge about historical and current racism in
American criminal justice system in its many manifestations, including
excessive bail and current jail conditions.11 It was the subject of
significant media attention. Ultimately, the case resumed on April 7, 1970
and, in a remarkable outcome, the jury acquitted all of the defendants in
just a few hours.12 As with the judge that presided over the Chicago Eight
trial, the books and literature on Black Panther Twenty-One portray
Judge Murtaugh as yet another biased judge in a 1960s political case.13
As a consequence of the Chicago Eight and Panther Twenty-One trials,
and all the attendant publicity, the New York State Bar Association and
the American College of Trial Lawyers appointed commissions due to
the widespread concern in the bar that “tactics of trial disruption . . . have
converted trials into spectacles of disorder and even violence.”14 Chief
Justice Warren Burger made numerous speeches about the importance of
civility in the courtroom.15 The ABA adopted a special report titled The
9. Lefcourt, supra note 5; see also To Judge Murtagh, supra note 6, at 187.
10. To Judge Murtagh, supra note 6, at 185.
11. Id. at 185–86.
The response by the defendants addresses itself not so much to the particular action by
the judge in halting the trial, but to the treatment inflicted on Black people under the
“Amerikan [sic] system of criminal justice” throughout American history.
The district attorney’s office conducted the longest trial in New York history, spent
over two million dollars, and put sixty-five witnesses on the stand. The three major
police undercover agents, who had joined the Panther Party at its inception, before the
majority of the defendants, testified that they had never seen or participated in the
attempted murder of policemen, actual bombings, or the attempted bombings of police
stations or public places. The judge had denied almost every defense motion before and
during the trial including the requests to lower the prohibitively high 100,000 dollar bail
set for most defendants and had ignored the defendants’ letter “To Judge Murtagh: From
the Panther 21”; the hearings resumed on April 7, 1970.
Id.
12. “[T]he jury, composed of five Blacks, one Puerto Rican, and six whites, stunned the nation
on May l3, l97l, when they acquitted all the defendants on all 156 charges. A number of jurors
expressed the belief that the judge was biased throughout the trial.” Id. at 186.
13. “Judge Murtagh’s did not seem to be a temperament that would have impelled him to lively
concern for the property and person of the criminal defendant unless the Supreme Court had guided
him toward it.” KEMPTON, supra note 7, at 93. “By habit then, Justice Murtagh absorbed the police
version of these events with the faith that assures accommodation between a judge’s deference to
the higher courts and his sympathy for the problems of prosecutors . . . .” Id. at 93–94.
14. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting the preamble to the July 1970 Report of
the American College of Trial Lawyers).
15. See, e.g., Excerpts From the Chief Justice’s Speech on the Need for Civility, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/excerpts-from-the-chief-justicesspeech-on-the-need-for-civility.html (“I urge that we never forget the necessity for civility as an
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Judge’s Role in Dealing with Trial Disruptions.16 State legislatures
passed new laws dealing with courtroom disruption.17 New rules of court
were adopted. Public discourse seemed to indicate deterioration of public
confidence in the judicial system. This conclusion, however, appeared to
be overblown. A study in New York, based upon responses to
questionnaires of a wide range of lawyers, established that disorder in the
courtroom was extremely rare and “has been overemphasized because . . .
both public and bar tend to focus on dramatic and publicized
confrontations without bearing in mind that these are highly
exceptional.”18
B. Judge Damon Keith: The Judicial Antidote
This was certainly true, and neither the bar nor the general public
focused upon the antidote to Judges Hoffman and Murtaugh: Judge
Damon Keith, then a relatively newly-appointed federal district court
judge in the Eastern District of Michigan. In contrast to Judges Hoffman
and Murtagh, Judge Keith presided over two cases involving political
radicals accused of violent acts with many of the same issues such as
electronic surveillance, but he conducted those cases in a fair-minded and
exemplary manner that generated much less publicity.
One of the cases over which Judge Keith presided occurred in 1970,
when John Sinclair, Lawrence Plamondon, and John Waterhouse Forrest
were charged with various acts of conspiracy in what was known as the
White Panther case.19 Subsequently, the “Weathermen” were charged
with conspiracy, various bombings, and other acts in another case
assigned to Judge Keith.20 In each instance, the judge was thoughtful and
courageous, and his decisions and conduct have received insufficient
attention outside of the state of Michigan. Lessons of the judicial conduct
indispensable part—the lubricant—that keeps our adversary system functioning.”).
16. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 9.
19. The White Panthers were a group of activists against the Vietnam War who modeled
themselves after the Black Panther Party and claimed to be revolutionaries. Jeff A. Hale, John
Sinclair: The White Panther Party, DEEP POL. F. (May 14, 2011, 3:03 PM),
https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/showthread.php?7071-John-Sinclair-The-White-PantherParty#.W0oHVthKj-Y.
20. The Weathermen were a radical group espousing revolution. They emerged in 1969 from
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and were known as SDS’s militant wing opposing
U.S. foreign policy, poverty, racism, and imprisonment. They became a committed small group of
revolutionaries who were viewed as one of the most serious threats to the Nixon administration.
The Weathermen engaged in symbolic bombings of institutions that they thought were the sources
of imperialist and racist policies. Arthur M. Eckstein, How the Weather Underground Failed at
Revolution and Still Changed the World, TIME (Nov. 2, 2016), http://time.com/
4549409/the-weather-underground-bad-moon-rising/.
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of the 1960s political cases—The Chicago Eight and the Black Panther
Twenty-One—would not be complete without reference to him.21
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE
It is well-documented that during this era, the government spied upon
domestic organizations and individuals, claiming that it was in the
national interest to do so. It took Judge Keith to unearth and challenge
these government claims which the Supreme Court ultimately declared
unconstitutional in United States v. U.S. District Court.22
The common thread that runs throughout all of the political cases
involving 1960s radicals brought to courts in the early 1970s is the Nixon
administration’s warrantless electronic surveillance of many of the
defendants and others who were targeted for their beliefs and actions.
This era, called the Age of Surveillance, saw the great expansion of a
“nationwide network of countersubversive [surveillance],” from its
origins in the 1920s to be used as a tool in the political arena.23 The
government perceived 1960s radicals to be a significant and increasing
threat because of their fear that they would cause a revolution. In earlier
years, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, was notorious for
wiretapping suspected communists and associates in the 1950s, and for
wiretapping Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and Elijah Muhammad in
the early 1960s.24 Beginning in 1964, based on the “possibility of
Communist infiltration,” the government engaged in warrantless
electronic surveillance of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating

21. There was some media attention focused upon Judge Keith’s cases but scant compared to
the Chicago Eight and Black Panther cases. There have subsequently been academic articles and
other writings about Judge Keith. See, e.g., PETER J. HAMMER & TREVOR W. COLEMAN,
CRUSADER FOR JUSTICE (2013); Blanche Bong Cook, A Paradigm for Equality: The Honorable
Damon J. Keith, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1161 (2001) (discussing a range of affirmative action, civil
rights cases as well as the Sinclair case); Edward J. Littlejohn, Damon Jerome Keith LawyerJudge-Humanitarian, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 321 (1996). The Sinclair case is also the focus of a
doctoral dissertation. Jeff A. Hale, Wiretapping and National Security: Nixon, The Mitchell
Doctrine, and the White Panthers (Aug. 1995) (doctoral dissertation, LSU Historical Dissertations
and
Theses),
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7014&context
=gradschool_disstheses.
22. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (stating that “the
Government’s concerns do not justify departure in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance”).
23. FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 245 (1981).
24. For the FBI’s file on Martin Luther King, Jr., see FBI Records: The Vault—Martin Luther
King, Jr., FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, https://vault.fbi.gov/Martin%20Luther%20King%
2C%20Jr. (last visited June 6, 2019). For the FBI’s file on Malcom X, see FBI Records: The Vault—
Malcom X, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, https://vault.fbi.gov/Malcolm%20X (last visited June
6, 2019).
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Committee.25
Richard Nixon, shortly after his election in November 1968, engaged
many intelligence agencies in his administration to propose extensive
plans to respond to various domestic groups who opposed the
government’s foreign and domestic policies. Those agencies
implemented a program of secret surveillance of many 1960s activists,
including the defendants in the Chicago Eight trial, the Black Panthers,
the White Panthers, the Weatherman, and many others.26 Nixon, it was
later learned during Watergate hearings, 27 considered antiwar activists,
dissenters, and others who opposed his policies as domestic “enemies”
who he believed to be subversives and unpatriotic. His Attorney General,
John Mitchell, claimed that this warrantless surveillance of all these
enemies was lawful and necessary in the “national interest,” and became
increasingly concerned that the programs and the surveillance were kept
secret.28

25. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), founded in 1960 as a nonviolent
direct-action group, emerged as a force in the southern civil rights movement largely through the
involvement of students in the 1960 Freedom Rides, designed to test a 1960 Supreme Court ruling
that declared segregation in interstate travel facilities unconstitutional. Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), STAN.: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES. & EDUC. INST.,
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/student-nonviolent-coordinating-committee-sncc
(last visited June 6, 2019).
26. DONNER, supra note 23; ROBERT WILLIAMS, POLITICAL SCANDALS IN THE USA 14 (1998).
27. The Senate Watergate Committee was established to investigate the scandal that resulted
from the burglary at the Watergate Hotel of the Democratic National Committee headquarters, any
subsequent cover-up of criminal activity, as well as “all other illegal, improper, or unethical conduct
occurring during the political campaign in 1972, including political espionage and campaign
finance practices.” It was formally known as the Senate Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities. It played a key role in gathering evidence that led the indictment of forty administration
officials and the conviction of several of Nixon’s aides for obstruction of justice and other crimes
and led to the impeachment process of Richard Nixon that then ultimately led to his resignation on
August 9, 1974. See Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate
Committee), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/
Watergate.htm (last visited June 6, 2019); see also Rufus Edmisten: Deputy Counsel, Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Watergate Committee), U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EdmistenRufus_Watergate.htm
(last visited June 6, 2019).
28. The Nixon administration’s subsequent challenge to the New York Times and Washington
Post for publication of the Pentagon Papers was part and parcel of the administration’s claim of
protection of “national security.” DONNER, supra note 23, at 247–48. The move toward expansion
of Presidential power was dubbed “The Imperial Presidency.” See generally ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). The use of the “plumbers” who burglarized
the Watergate Hotel and engaged in a range of other unlawful activities, established that “[f]or the
first time in American history a chief executive organized an intelligence capability answerable
only to himself and operating outside the legal-constitutional system, not only for the purpose of
passive information-gathering but to develop aggressive means of injuring and neutralizing
targets.” DONNER, supra note 23, at 250.
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A. Katz v. United States and Alderman v. United States
Mitchell’s claim that warrantless surveillance was lawful if in the
national interest had yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In the 1967
case, Katz v. United States, the Court held that electronic surveillance was
governed by the Fourth Amendment, but it reserved the question of
whether “safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would
satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security.”29 Congress had not “resolved the question of whether the
president has inherent power to authorize electronic surveillance without
obtaining a judicial warrant when national security is threatened.”30
A few months later, in March 1969, the Supreme Court decided
Alderman v. United States. The Court held that in a criminal trial, the
government must notify the court of any electronic surveillance of the
defendants.31 If the court determines the eavesdropping to be illegal, the
defendants were entitled to inspect the logs and summaries of the
conversations to determine whether those overheard conversations had
tainted the evidence in the case.32 A government refusal to disclose the
fact of surveillance orders would result in dismissal of the case.33
Alderman sent shock waves through the Nixon administration.
Attorney General Mitchell and other government officials sought to
reverse that decision without success. Mitchell testified before the Senate
committee that “enforced disclosure of transcripts of countersubversive
taps would endanger not only the safety of the nation but the lives of
federal agents as well.”34 Nevertheless, Alderman remained the law at the
time of these various cases.
On June 23, 1969, in the Chicago Eight case, the government answered
the defense’s request to disclose electronic surveillance pursuant to the
Alderman decision. The government produced the affidavit of Attorney
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
30. DONNER, supra note 23, at 246. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act that authorizes federal courts to issue wiretap warrants at the Attorney General’s
request based upon probable cause that the individual is engaged in committing, or has committed,
an enumerated crime. But
[t]he statute merely stated that nothing in it “shall . . . limit the constitutional power of
the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States
against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against
any other clear and present danger to the structure for existence of the Government.”
Id. at 245–46.
31. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (stating that “the general rule
under the [Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968] is that official eavesdropping and
wiretapping are permitted only with probable cause and a warrant”).
32. Id. at 181.
33. Id.
34. DONNER, supra note 23, at 247.
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General John Mitchell asserting that “the President, acting through the
Attorney General, has the inherent constitutional power to authorize
electronic surveillance without judicial warrant” to protect the national
security, and that the president could unilaterally determine the activities
that threaten national security. 35 Consequently, the government asserted
that the wiretaps were legal and that, in any event, these were so
confidential and sensitive that the defendants and their attorneys should
not be permitted to see them.36 Mitchell had insisted that the domestic
threat from various domestic organizations and individuals was more
significant than foreign ones.37 The eavesdropping was not necessarily to
prosecute the target but to gather “domestic intelligence.”38
This warrantless surveillance, the subject of numerous motions in the
Chicago Eight case, was upheld by Judge Hoffman who summarily
denied the defense’s requests to obtain information about such
surveillance and/or an evidentiary hearing.39 Instead, he set the matter
over for post-trial hearing. At that hearing, he denied the defense’s
requests for disclosure and any other remedy.40
35. Id. See Affidavit of the Attorney General of the United States of America, United States v.
Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1970); Affidavit of the Attorney General of the United
States of America, United States v. Ayers, No. 48014 (E.D. Mich. filed Sept. 28, 1971).
36. Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Julius Hoffman on Feb. 20, 1970, Dellinger, No. 69 CR
180. See Affidavit of the Attorney General of the United States of America, Dellinger, No. 69 CR
180 (asserting the wiretaps were legal); Affidavit of the Attorney General of the United States of
America, Ayers, No. 48014 (same). See also United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1076–79
(E.D. Mich. 1971) (noting the government’s assertion that the wiretaps were legal).
37. DONNER, supra note 23, at 247; see also Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1079 (explaining the
government’s argument “that the President should . . . have the constitutional power to gather
information concerning domestic organizations which seek to subvert the Government by unlawful
means” and then stating that that argument “is untenable”).
38. DONNER, supra note 23, at 247. In a California Black Panther case, United States v. Smith,
321 F. Supp. 424, 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the government disclosed the existence of such surveillance
on appeal. Judge Ferguson, in declaring the surveillance unconstitutional, noted that
the government seems to approach these dissident domestic organizations in the same
fashion as it deals with unfriendly foreign powers. The government cannot act in this
manner when only domestic political organizations are involved, even if those
organizations espouse views which are inconsistent with our present form of
government. To do so is to ride roughshod over numerous political freedoms which have
long received constitutional protection. The government can, of course, investigate and
prosecute criminal violations whenever these organizations, or rather their individual
members, step over the line of political theory and general advocacy and commit illegal
acts.
Id. at 429.
39. Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Julius Hoffman on Feb. 20, 1970, Dellinger, No. 69 CR
180; see also In re Dellinger, 357 F. Supp. 949, 958–59 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (denying the surveillance
disclosures on appeal).
40. Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Julius Hoffman on Feb. 20, 1970, Dellinger, No. 69 CR
180. The same government claims supported the burglary of the Watergate Hotel. As James
McCord testified before the “Watergate Committee,” the Senate Select Committee investigating
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B. United States v. Sinclair and United States v. U.S. District Court
On December 7, 1969, three defendants in United States v. Sinclair,
the “White Panther case,” were charged with conspiracy to destroy
government property, and one defendant was charged with bombing a
Central Intelligence Agency recruitment office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.41 These defendants, like the Chicago Eight and Panther
Twenty-One defendants, were deemed domestic enemies whom the
Nixon administration believed to be subversive and unpatriotic. This was
the climate in which Judge Keith was assigned the Sinclair case.42 It was
the same electronic surveillance issue based upon the same Mitchell
affidavit the defense filed in the Chicago Eight case before Judge
Hoffman.43
In pretrial motions, just as in the Chicago Eight case, the defendants
moved, pursuant to Alderman, to compel the United States to disclose
certain electronic surveillance information and for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether this information tainted the case.44 In response, the
government filed the affidavit of Attorney General John Mitchell,
acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which one
of the defendants had participated, and that the attorney general approved
the wiretaps “to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and
subvert the existing structure of the Government.”45
The government claimed that the surveillance was lawful even if it was
conducted without a warrant, as a reasonable exercise of the president’s
power through the attorney general to protect national security. 46 The
surveillance logs were filed under seal with Judge Keith for inspection.
On January 26, 1971, Judge Keith held that the surveillance violated

the presidential election, he thought the Watergate burglary was legal because, like the Chicago
Eight surveillance, it was authorized by the attorney general for national security and for
“intelligence purposes.” See DONNER, supra note 23, at 246–47.
41. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972).
42. Another judge, Talbot Smith, was assigned the case but stepped away from it because he
“feared for his safety and that of his family.” He suggested to his colleagues that Keith, the newest
member of the bench, be appointed. Ultimately, there was a blind draw for the assignment and the
case went to Keith. HAMMER & COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 142.
43. Compare Affidavit of the Attorney General of the United States of America, Dellinger, No.
69 CR 180, with U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. at 300 n.2 (“This affidavit is submitted in
connection with the Government’s opposition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of
information concerning the overhearing of his conversations which occurred during the course of
electronic surveillances which the Government contends were legal.”).
44. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1075–76 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
45. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. at 300 (quoting the Mitchell Affidavit).
46. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1076.
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the Fourth Amendment.47 Judge Keith wrote,
In the opinion of this Court, the position of the Attorney General is
untenable. It is supported neither historically, nor by the language of the
Omnibus Crime Act. Such power held by one individual was never
contemplated by the framers of our Constitution and cannot be tolerated
today.48

He ordered the government to make full disclosure of the overheard
conversations and “in the exercise of its discretion, further orders that an
evidentiary hearing be held to determine the existence of taint, either as
to the indictment or as to the evidence introduced at trial, be conducted at
the conclusion of the trial of this matter.”49
Many have characterized the ruling as a “dramatic and unprecedented
ruling [that] shook the nation. It was the first time a federal judge had
ever challenged a sitting president’s authority to pursue a particular
national security strategy.”50 Judge Keith was the subject of extensive
criticism. The Nixon administration was reportedly infuriated and took
the unusual step of filing a writ of mandamus against the judge himself.
The Sixth Circuit upheld Judge Keith’s decision.51 Keith, who had been
on the bench for only five years, thought the odds that the Supreme Court
would uphold his decision were slim.52 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, in a stunning 8-0 opinion in United States v. U.S. District
Court, the Court announced on June 19, 1972 that it agreed with Judge
Keith’s ruling.53 In powerful language, Justice Powell wrote:
Fourth amendment protections become the more necessary when the
targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy
in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where
the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power
to protect “domestic security.”54

The case became known as the “Keith Case.” The Mitchell doctrine
47. Id. at 1077.
48. Id. at 1079.
49. Id. at 1080.
50. HAMMER & COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 138.
51. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 1971). His ruling was
controversial. Many of his colleagues thought that the judiciary should defer to the president in
matters claimed to involve national security. “If the attorney general and the president of the United
States think it’s needed to defend our national security, who are you, as a judge, to tell them
otherwise?” HAMMER & COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 139 (emphasis omitted).
52. HAMMER & COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 140.
53. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The Supreme Court permitted
Arthur Kinoy, attorney for the defendants, to argue, without interruption, for more than an hour.
Robert Mardian, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, was counsel for
the government. He was one of the architects of the government’s sweeping, illegal surveillance
program and was subsequently indicted for his role in Watergate.
54. Id. at 314.
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was now unlawful.55 The decision was heralded around the country as a
triumph for civil liberties and constitutional rights.
Many Washington insiders believe that the Keith decision was key
in Nixon’s resignation, as after the Supreme Court had reached its
decision [in U.S. District Court] on Friday, June 16, 1972, there was a
leak that the decision would be announced publicly on Monday, June
19. Members of the Committee to Reelect the President had previously
installed bugs at offices of Democrats in the Watergate building. The
thinking goes that, in view of the impending Supreme Court ruling, the
White House ordered the bugs be removed. Howard Hunt and the rest
of Nixon’s Plumbers came to the Watergate on Saturday night. The
fallout from the break-in was what led to Nixon’s resignation in 1974,
and then to the investigation of the NSA itself in 1975 that exposed the
rogue role of the NSA.56
55. The Court readily dismissed various government arguments that resonate today in national
security cases:
The Government argues that the special circumstances applicable to domestic security
surveillances necessitate a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is urged that
the requirement of prior judicial review would obstruct the President in the discharge of
his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. We are told further that these
surveillances are directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence
with respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt to gather evidence for specific
criminal prosecutions. It is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to
traditional warrant requirements which were established to govern investigation of
criminal activity, not ongoing intelligence gathering.
The Government further insists that courts “as a practical matter would have neither
the knowledge nor the techniques necessary to determine whether there was probable
cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security.” These
security problems, the Government contends, involve “a large number of complex and
subtle factors” beyond the competence of courts to evaluate.
....
We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal security matters are too
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult
issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive
to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly,
courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different
considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary crime.” If the threat is too subtle or
complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court,
one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance.
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official
intelligence gathering.
Id. at 318–20 (citations omitted).
56. Bill Simpich, Wiretapping in America: The Moment of Decision Is Near, BANDERAS NEWS
(Aug. 2006), http://www.banderasnews.com/0608/nt-wiretappinginamerica.htm. In the postWatergate atmosphere, the Church Committee took a hard look at the NSA for the first time. It
emerged that, from its inception in 1952 until mid-70s, the NSA worked hand in glove with Western
Union in “Operation Shamrock,” reading every telegram that came in and out of the United States.
An Impeachable Offense? Bush Admits Authorizing NSA to Eavesdrop on Americans Without Court
Approval, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 19, 2005), https://www.democracynow.org/2005/12/19/an_
impeachable_offense_bush_admits_authorizing. Even more insidious was the exposure of
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Beyond Nixon’s resignation, Judge Keith’s “order rocked the NSA,”
because it exposed the questionable practices of electronic surveillance.57
The revelations ultimately led to numerous criminal charges including
the indictment of FBI officials.58
Judge Hoffman, could, of course, have embarked upon a path of
examining the Mitchell doctrine, but he blithely accepted the
government’s unconstitutional policy.
III. UNITED STATES V. AYERS
United States v. Sinclair was not Judge Keith’s only principled,
courageous action involving government surveillance in that era. Earlier,
Judge Keith had been assigned the July 23, 1970 indictment in United
States v. Rudd, a case against Mark Rudd and twelve other members of
the Weathermen for conspiracy to bomb a number of institutions
including the New York City Police Department headquarters, the
Presidio army base in San Francisco, a Long Island City courthouse,
several banks in Boston and New York, and other institutions that they
claimed to be the sources of imperialist and racist policies.59
This was not Keith’s first involvement with the Weathermen. In July
1970, Guy Goodwin, the field commander and special litigation attorney
of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, asked Judge
Keith to sign off on an immunity order for a person known as Martha
Real.60 He did. Unbeknownst to Judge Keith, the information obtained in
“Operation Minaret,” revealing that, between 1970 and 1975, the agency also monitored the calls
of “large numbers of anti-Vietnam war protesters who were violating no law.” Statement—James
Bamford, NSA Lawsuit Client, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/statement-james-bamford-nsalawsuit-client (last visited June 6, 2019); see also JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 351
(1974) (explaining Keith’s role in judicial independence).
57. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 291 (1982). Keith has been noted as “one of
the foundations of our modern conception of privacy rights.” Bob Talbert, Current Crisis Has
Echoes in Wiretap Ruling, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 30, 1998, at 3C (quoting Jeff A. Hale).
58. Charles R. Babcock, Gray, 2 High-Ranking Aides Are Indicted in FBI Break-Ins, WASH.
POST (Apr. 11, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/04/11/gray-2-highranking-aides-are-indicted-in-fbi-break-ins/ed0c09a0-f8bd-4192-b090-38fe9147efbc/?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.324f55de197b; Gerald Lefcourt, Warrantlessness, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 1978),
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/05/20/archives/warrantlessness.html (explaining why FBI claims
were false and that J. Wallace La Prade, W. Mark Felt, and Edward Miller should be indicted).
59. See Criminal Docket, United States v. Rudd, No. 45119 (naming defendants William Ayers,
Linda Evans, Dianne Donghi, Jane Spielman, Larry Grathwohl, Robert Burlinham, Bernadine
Dohrn, Kathy Boudin, Cathy Wilkerson, Russell Neufeld, Ronald Fleigelman, and Naomi Jaffe).
Larry Grathwohl was later discovered to be a government informant. DONNER, supra note 23, at
354.
60. FRANK J. DONNER & RICHARD I. LAVINE, FROM THE WATERGATE PERSPECTIVE—
KANGAROO GRAND JURIES, 119 CONG. REC. 40,674, 40,679 (Dec. 11, 1973),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1973-pt31/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1973-pt31-31.pdf.
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connection with the order for Ms. Real stemmed from illegally obtained
evidence that he later declared to be unlawful.61 With the immunity order,
Guy Goodwin proceeded to question Ms. Real about the items illegally
seized in her apartment in Illinois in April 1970.62 Goodwin questioned
her about wiretapped conversations she had with people who became the
defendants in the Weatherman case.63 Also, unbeknownst to Judge Keith,
Goodwin was the government contact for Larry Grathwohl, who later
became the major infiltrator in the Weathermen organization and defense
camp.64
United States v. Rudd was put on hold pending the decision in United
States v. U.S. District Court and was reinstated by superseding indictment
on December 7, 1972 against the same defendants. It was now called
United States v. Ayers.65
In March 1973, the defense filed a motion to disclose electronic
surveillance and for an evidentiary hearing on the sufficiency of the
disclosure.66 The government disclosed the existence of wiretaps but not
a summary of their contents. The government characterized those
wiretaps as not involving any direct overhearing of any of the defendants
related to the case.67 Apparently emboldened by the Supreme Court’s
decision in U.S. District Court, Keith did not accept the government’s
generalized contentions about surveillance and that issue ended up front
and center in the Ayers case.68 The defense provided extensive affidavits
to the court regarding various indictments around the country brought by
Guy Goodwin who had directed grand jury investigations against radicals

61. Id.
62. Id. at 40,679–80.
63. Id.
64. Gerald Lefcourt, Constitution Suspended 1969–1973: Those Who Seek Order by Sacrificing
Liberty Deserve neither Liberty nor Order 15 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see
also DONNER, supra note 23, at 360.
65. Lefcourt, supra note 5; Criminal Docket, United States v. Ayers, No. 48104 (E.D. Mich.
1973) (on file with author).
66. Criminal Docket, Ayers, No. 48104; Motion for Disclosure of Electronic Surveillance: For
an Evidentiary Hearing on the Sufficiency of Disclosure: And for a Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress
Evidence and to Dismiss the Indictment on Account of Illegal Electronic Surveillance, Ayers, No.
48104; Reply to Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure of Electronic
Surveillance, for Full Investigation of Surveillance and for Further Relief, Ayers, No. 48104.
67. Reply to Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure of Electronic
Surveillance, for Full Investigation of Surveillance and for Further Relief at 38, Ayers, No. 48104.
68. See Criminal Docket, Ayers, No. 48104 (noting Judge Kieth’s orders requiring “disclosure
of certain illegal electronic surveillance” and multiple orders and hearings concerning the
surveillance and its legality throughout the case).
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nationwide.69 The Mitchell affidavit was offered in each of these cases.70
This case was litigated in the climate of Watergate where, in January
1973, former Nixon aides, G. Gordon Liddy, and James W. McCord Jr.,
were convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and wiretapping in the Watergate
scandal.71 Five others pled guilty.72 In April 1973, Nixon’s top White
House staffers, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, and Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst resigned.73 Sam Ervin, chair of the Senate
Watergate Committee had revealed “I have seen a document that exhibits
totalitarian mentality—the Huston document.”74
On June 3, 1973, the Washington Post reported that John Dean told the
Watergate investigators that that he discussed the Watergate cover-up
with President Nixon at least thirty-five times.75
On June 4, 1973, the day after the Washington Post story, Judge Keith
held a lengthy hearing on the defense motion to suppress evidence and
conducted an in-camera inspection of the logs of conversations and
related materials.76 The public revelations played prominently in the June
4th hearing. Keith stated unequivocally at that hearing: “I will not permit
my courtroom to be used to launder illegally seized material.”77
On June 5, 1973 Judge Keith “issued a sweeping order . . . for the
Government to disclose whether it had used burglaries, sabotage,
69. Lefcourt, supra note 5; see e.g., DONNER, supra note 23, at 373 (explaining Goodwin’s
involvement in the grand jury proceeding against Vietnam Veterans Against the War).
70. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Disclosure of Electronic Surveillance and
for Other Relief, Ayers, No. 48104. United States v. Dellinger was among those cases, as well as
cases whose popular names were the Vietnam Veterans Against the War case, Harrisburg case,
Baltimore Panther case, Seattle Seven case, Camden 28 case, and others. See Letter from William
Bender to Judge Damon Keith (Mar. 9, 1973) (on file with author) (including information that
Arthur Kinoy, who argued U.S. District Court before SCOTUS and was counsel in the Chicago
Eight trial, had been the subject of illegal surveillance); Letter from William Bender to Judge
Damon Keith (May 31, 1973) (on file with author) (same). Many of those cases were dismissed or
resulted in acquittals.
71. Lawrence Meyer, Last Two Guilty in Watergate Plot: Ex-Aides of Nixon to Appeal: Jury
Convicts Liddy, McCord in 90 Minutes, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1973),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/0131732.htm?noredirect=on.
72. Id.
73. Lawrence Stern & Haynes Johnson, 3 Top Nixon Aides, Kleindienst Out; President Accepts
Full Responsibility; Richardson Will Conduct New Probe, WASH. POST (May 1, 1973),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/050173-1.htm.
74. Lefcourt, supra note 5.
75. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Dean Alleges Nixon Knew of Cover-up Plan, WASH.
POST (June 3, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dean-alleges-nixon-knew-ofcover-up-plan/2012/06/04/gJQAgpyCJV_story.html?utm_term=.7a80f127d842.
76. See Order of June 4, 1973, United States v. Ayers, No. 48104 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (on file
with author); Louis Heldman, U.S. Told to Reveal Illegal Acts, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 7, 1973,
at 12-A.
77. Lefcourt, supra note 5.
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electronic surveillance, agents provocateurs or other ‘espionage
techniques’” against the defendants.78 It specified that the government
must disclose “‘whether and to what extent the White House staff [or]
CIA, FBI, Department of Justice, Treasury or Defense Departments and
the Secret Service participated [in] burglary, acts of sabotage’ or other
illegal acts.”79 The order specified that this included the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee formed by John Dean to carry out the 1970
domestic intelligence plan known as the Huston Plan, as well as The
White House Investigation Unit (known as the “plumbers”).80 At the
time, the full extent of the Huston Plan was not known by the court or the
defense.
Judge Keith ordered the disclosure of certain illegal electronic
surveillance, including the logs, and summaries of conversation.81 A
hearing was set for June 18, 1973.82
The government then turned over thousands of pages of overheard
conversations of four of the fifteen defendants.83 The hearing was
postponed. Two weeks later, after defense attorneys provided the court
with published reports that investigators for the Senate Watergate
Committee had discovered illegal surveillance against the defendants,
Judge Keith ordered the government to disclose any Watergate-type
burglaries or espionage conducted against the defendants.84 Defense
counsel indicated that they would subpoena Watergate figures as well as
administration officials engaged in intelligence work to testify at the
evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel charged that their offices and homes
had been burglarized and files ransacked.85
The government responded to Judge Keith’s order with a two-page
affidavit from the FBI claiming that it was not in possession of any
78. Agis Salpukas, U.S. Forgoes Trial of Weathermen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/16/archives/us-forgoes-trial-of-weathermen-disclosure-ofsecurity-data-feared.html; see also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. SENATE 94TH CONG., THE
WEATHER UNDERGROUND: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
(1975), available at http://li.proquest.com/elhpdf/histcontext/CMP-1975-SJS-0006.pdf.
79. U.S. Must Reveal Spy Acts, DETROIT NEWS, June 19, 1973, at 10-A (alterations in original)
(quoting the order).
80. This information was obtained by Watergate Special Prosecutor and the Senate Select
Committee. Jeffrey Hadden, Watergate Panel Probes Detroit Cases, DETROIT NEWS, July 10,

1973, at 18-A.
81. Order of June 4, 1973, Ayers, No. 48104; Heldman, supra note 76.
82. Order of June 4, 1973, Ayers, No. 48104; Heldman, supra note 76.
83. Heldman, supra note 76.
84. Id.; U.S. Must Reveal Spy Acts, supra note 79.
85. Five lawyers subsequently established the burglaries of their homes and offices. Lefcourt’s
home and office were burglarized several times. See Hadden, supra note 80; Lefcourt, supra note
64.
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information developed from any government agency through
unauthorized or illegal activity.86 The court deemed this response wholly
inadequate.87
On July 10, 1973, Judge Keith ordered the government to “fully
respond with sworn answers to the Court’s inquiry into governmental
misconduct” and that affidavits from each agency be filed by September
3, 1973.88 Remarkably, he ordered that:
the defense and prosecution shall be permitted to call all witnesses
deemed necessary and appropriate by them to further this inquiry into
government illegality. The scope of the inquiry includes the activities
of all named government agencies, employees or agents of the White
House and private persons acting on behalf of agencies of
government.89

The inquiry was not limited to the defendants but included Students
for a Democratic Society and/or its Weatherman factions, and/or
attorneys for any of those defendants.90 He set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing on September 24, 1973.91
On July 12, 1973, defense counsel William Bender wrote to Watergate
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox requesting that he make available the
“substance of [his] investigation” so that the defense “may properly
execute [its] responsibilities in this case—the presentation of all instances
of government misconduct as they may relate to this pending
prosecution.”92 The defense subsequently filed additional letters and
pleadings with the court regarding the extent and knowledge of the illegal
electronic surveillance from other cases around the country. They filed
affidavits in support of motions to dismiss the indictment as well as
motions for more detailed information about the surveillance and an
evidentiary hearing.93
In preparation for the September hearing, Attorneys Gerald Lefcourt
and William Bender went to Washington D.C. and met with members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, prominent journalists, and former
government officials. They developed a detailed understanding of the
86. Hadden, supra note 80.
87. Id.
88. Order of July 10, 1973, United States v. Ayers, No. 48014 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (on file with
author).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; William K. Stevens, Judge to Review Plea of Radicals, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/10/archives/judge-to-review-plea-of-radicals-scores-us-on-itsdenial-of-charges.html.
92. Letter from William J. Bender to Archibald Cox (July 12, 1973) (on file with author).
93. Criminal Docket, Ayers, No. 48104.
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U.S. Department of Justice Internal Security Division and its sweeping
surveillance through many government agencies of antiwar activists,
environmentalists, consumer advocates, lawyers for radicals, and others
designated at radicals. They were developing the list of witnesses for the
September hearing including Tom Huston, the known architect of the
1970 surveillance blueprint, the Huston Plan.94
In the summer of 1973, as the defense prepared for the evidentiary
hearing, Tom Charles Huston, the “Conservative Architect of Security
Plan,” a researcher, and at that time, a project officer for the White
House,95 called Gerald Lefcourt and said that he would meet if Lefcourt
came to Indianapolis and the meeting was kept confidential. Lefcourt
agreed. They met at a quiet restaurant. Huston first searched Lefcourt and
then told him “I will tell you whatever you want to know as long as you
do not call me as a witness.”96 They agreed.
Huston then revealed details about the 1970 Huston Intelligence Plan
involving coordination among various agencies to conduct extensive
surveillance.97 Huston told Lefcourt that he was asked to draft an
intelligence plan that was to be used only for “catastrophes.” 98 He
proposed such a plan that involved coordination among many
government agencies.99 Huston told Lefcourt that on June 5, 1970, the
president called a meeting involving the FBI, CIA, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and each of the military
service intelligence apparatuses.100 Within months, a plan was drafted
that called for a large covert campaign of increased domestic spying with
its main elements consisting of burglaries, wiretaps, infiltration on
campuses, use of military intelligence operatives, and mail covers, which
included opening mail and photostating it.101 The plan specifically
approved burglaries, which it acknowledged were clearly illegal. 102 All
agencies signed off on it, and in July 1970, Richard Nixon authorized its
implementation.103
Huston said that Robert Mardian, chief of the Internal Security
94. Lefcourt, supra note 64, at 10–11; Interview with William Bender (May 15, 2018).
95. Christopher Lydon, Conservative Architect of Security Plan Tom Charles Huston, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/24/archives/conservative-architect-ofsecurity-tom-charles-huston-man-in-the.html.
96. Interview with Gerald Lefcourt (June 21, 2018) (notes on file with author).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Salpukas, supra note 78.
102. Lefcourt, supra note 96.
103. Id.
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Division of Department of Justice, came to him either in late 1970 or 1971
and said that the Justice Department wanted to implement the plan against
domestic radicals. Huston told him that it would be illegal because the
plan is for catastrophes only, and it calls for illegal activity. 104 Huston
would not do it, but Mardian implemented it anyway, and after Judge
Keith’s decision in United States v. U.S. District Court, the government
decided to continue with the Weatherman case only. Other cases
marshalled by Guy Goodwin were either dismissed or not indicted.105
Huston said that Nixon’s denials that the government had implemented
the Huston Plan were false.106
Such information from Huston was a major breakthrough. The defense
now understood the sweep of illegal surveillance throughout many
government agencies and the role of Robert Mardian, and of Guy
Goodwin. The Internal Security Division had many resources, including
sixty lawyers and dossier gathering with ties to White House, downward
to the FBI, CIA, Treasury, Post Office, and local intelligence agencies.107
The Huston Intelligence Plan had been used in many cases and was
prepared by Guy Goodwin.108 The defense previously knew of
Goodwin’s involvement in cases across the county. Now armed with
additional information about the Huston Plan and its use in cases across
the United States, they obtained the Plan.
As the defense lawyers travelled the country interviewing a wide range
of former congressional aides, news media, and dozens of others who
could prepare them for the task of proving, with subpoena power, the
suspected “massive record of illegal espionage tactics never before seen
in judicial history,” Goodwin and other government lawyers strategized
about ways to avoid it.109
The 1973 environment was a significant change from the 1970
indictment of the Weathermen. John Mitchell was no longer the attorney
general and was under indictment.110 Robert Mardian, no longer the head
of the Internal Security Division, was testifying at Watergate hearings
104. Id.
105. Lefcourt, supra note 5; Lefcourt, supra note 96.
106. Nixon’s involvement in the implementation of the Huston Plan was to be one of the articles
of impeachment against him. He resigned and therefore did not face impeachment. Lefcourt, supra
note 5.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Lefcourt, supra note 64, at 27.
110. Anthony Ripley, Federal Grand Jury Indicts 7 Nixon Aides on Charges of Conspiracy on
Watergate; Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell on List, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/03/02/archives/federal-grand-jury-indicts-7-nixon-aides-oncharges-of-conspiracy.html.
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hoping to avoid indictment. Vice President Agnew was under
investigation, and the President of the United States was implicated in the
Watergate burglaries.111
In response to Judge Keith’s orders, the government failed to produce
the required documentation and repeatedly filed motions for Extension of
Time. The evidentiary hearing was postponed and was set for November
15, 1973.
Judge Keith’s proposed evidentiary hearing that might expose other
instances of government surveillance and illegality was unprecedented:
The hearing contemplated by Judge Keith’s orders would have
allowed the most searching inquiry into government intelligence
apparatus yet conceived. Nowhere, not in any congressional
committees, not in the media, and certainly no private group had ever
undertaken what was about to be done in that Detroit courtroom.
Officials from the White House, CIA, National Security Agency, the
Treasury, Defense, and Justice Departments were on the verge of being
put on the witness stand and questioned by hostile adversaries for
defendants charged with a conspiracy to cross state lines with the
intention of using and possessing explosives. The questioning would
not have been the impartial debate presented vividly in most of the
questioning of the Watergate Committee, but would have been the
clearly partial, searching inquiry of criminal defense lawyers who were
certain and had evidence of massive government misconduct.
. . . [T]he defense wondered how many officials would be forced to
take the Fifth Amendment rather than to divulge illegal activities of the
government.112

The hearing never occurred. On October 15, 1973, the government
came before the court and submitted a motion and order for dismissal of
the prosecution.
Ralph B. Guy Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Michigan, in presenting the Government’s motion, said that in an effort
to carry out Judge Keith’s order sworn statements had been obtained
from the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Secret Service and the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee of the Justice Department that none
of the agencies had engaged in any illegal conduct in the case.
111. Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation: Hearings Before the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong.
2345–88 (1973) (testimony of Robert Mardian), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.
39015078682583;view=1up;seq=5. For the FBI’s file on Agnew, see generally FBI Records: The
Vault—Spiro Agnew, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, https://vault.fbi.gov/Spiro%20Agnew/
#disablemobile (last visited June 7, 2019).
112. Lefcourt, supra note 64, at 28.
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Mr. Guy said, however, that the Government had chosen to dismiss
the case because it would have had to disclose “foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States.”113

Guy moved to dismiss the indictment against the four defendants who
had appeared in court.114 Many of the other defendants were
underground. Keith dismissed against all defendants and did so with
prejudice.115
The defense lawyers argued that the government dropped the case
because a hearing would have demonstrated the abusive and unlawful
government activities including widespread surveillance, burglaries, and
mail searches.116 In extensive press coverage, Gerald Lefcourt “called the
case a ‘malicious prosecution, an abuse of the Bill of Rights from one end
to another to punish the defendants’ without the aim of ever bringing
them to trial. Mr. Guy disputed this, saying that ‘we had a good case.’”117
Judge Keith was the subject of a good deal of hate mail.118
Nevertheless, he remained steadfast in his views of the significance of
constitutional rights and went on to decide a wide range of civil rights
cases.
IV. LESSONS FOR JUDGING
The 1970s cases of radical defendants in Judge Keith’s courtroom had
the potential to be as explosive as those in the courtrooms of Judges
Hoffman and Murtagh. What was so different about Judge Keith’s
approach? The question is not answered by the fact that the notorious
incidents in the Chicago Eight and Panther trials were primarily in trial
and Judge Keith’s cases were in pretrial conduct. The antics in Judges
Hoffman and Murtagh’s trials and the animus toward the defense were
evident from the beginning of each of those cases.119
The bar and the bench explored this question by focusing on “when
trial judges may act to control their courtrooms” in its examination of the
Chicago Eight, Panther Twenty-One, and the Weatherman cases.120 The
guiding principle of that study was “[t]here is no substitute for a trial
judge who knows how to run his courtroom.”121 Significantly, the
113. Salpukas, supra note 78.
114. Lefcourt, supra note 5; Lefcourt, supra note 96.
115. Lefcourt, supra note 5; Lefcourt, supra note 96.
116. Salpukas, supra note 78.
117. Id.
118. Letters from the Keith Archives at Walter Reuther Library at Wayne State Law School (on
file with author).
119. See KEMPTON, supra note 7, at 27–29.
120. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 93.
121. Id. (quoting Whitney North Seymour).
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conclusions reached by the bar focused not only on what is currently
called “procedural fairness”122 but upon the court as an “exemplar of
justice,” of “fairness, understanding, and even-handed application of the
law.”123 Judges who are and who are perceived to be fundamentally fair
to both sides are less likely to be treated with disrespect. “The trial judge
must be firmly in charge. He must create the impression that he is fair by
being fair.”124
Disorder in the Court reported that Judges Hoffman and Murtagh used
the heavy hands of government to control the defendants and that they
engaged in “arbitrary, biased and vindictive remarks or rulings.”125 The
Seventh Circuit, in reversing the conviction in the Chicago Eight trial said
that Judge Hoffman’s prejudicial conduct before the jury was
“deprecatory of defense counsel and their case . . . . [and] cumulatively,
they must have telegraphed to the jury the judge’s contempt for the
defense.”126 Similarly, the prejudicial conduct of Judge Murtagh and
Hoffman led to disruption in their courtrooms among other ills; the judges
engaged in practices and pretrial rulings that were streamlined toward
conviction.127
By contrast, Judge Keith had engendered great respect among the
lawyers by exhibiting his overriding sense of fairness so lawyers knew
that cases in his courtroom would be handled well.128 As William
Kunstler, famed lawyer in the Chicago Eight trial, said:
In Chicago, where Judge Hoffman turned off and didn’t want to deal
with anything and the marshals in the courtroom were often
confrontational, the defendants reacted accordingly. But the White
Panther case was very different. I am often asked how judges can stop
disruptive trials. One answer is to have more judges like Damon Keith.
On the first day of trial, he called the prosecutors and defense lawyers
into his chambers for a conference; he served, as I recall, very delicious
buns and coffee. He broadly hinted to Len [Weinglass] and me that he
did not expect this trial to be similar to Chicago. We assured him that

122. See Emily Gold LaGratta & Phil Bowen, To Be Fair: Procedural Fairness in Courts,
CRIM. JUST. ALLIANCE (Nov. 2014), https://justiceinnovation.org/publications/be-fair-proceduralfairness-courts (stating that “procedural fairness” refers to practices and procedures for courts to
be “respectful, neutral, easy to understand and give people involved in the case have [sic] a voice,
they can build trust in the law”).
123. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 193.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 201–02.
126. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 387 (7th Cir. 1972).
127. See KEMPTON, supra note 7, at 93–95.
128. Lefcourt, supra note 5; Lefcourt, supra note 96; Bender, supra note 94.

2019]

Judge Keith: The Judicial Antidote

1011

unless we had the same type of provocations that permeated the
Chicago trial, we didn’t expect any difficulties.129

One fundamental question from the Keith cases and from the Chicago
Eight and Panther Twenty-One cases is: Why, in an adversary system,
does the judiciary often exhibit an unbalanced trust in one party to a
case—the government, particularly in highly charged political cases? It
is crucial that “[j]udges and prosecutors . . . have a better understanding
of the sense of unfairness or outrage that many representatives of political
outgroups feel when the criminal law is invoked against them for what
they view as their political opposition to the government.”130 It is
generous to note that Judges Hoffman and Murtagh lacked that
perspective. Judge Keith, on the other hand, understood that sense of
outrage and unfairness and was able not only to control his courtroom,
but to embody the best of judicial independence. Among other virtues,
Judge Keith was unwilling to treat the government’s arguments with
more deference than those of the defense. This is unusual. Judicial
unbalanced trust in one party—the government—is all too common
especially in the cases that do not receive extensive publicity.
Perhaps, at least after Judge Keith’s decisions and the fallout from
Watergate, some judges became more skeptical about blanket acceptance
of various government assertions. Increased judicial independence and
more equal treatment of parties in criminal cases is claimed to have grown
from the 1970s electronic surveillance cases at least for some period of
time.131
Some judges may have learned this lesson from Judge Keith, but
anecdotal reports suggest otherwise. Many judges, particularly federal
judges, are former United States attorneys and instinctively trust their
former office’s lawyers more than they trust lawyers for the defense.
Compounding the affinity with former colleagues, cognitive bias among
judges also plays a significant role in what is perceived as unequal
treatment. Many judges, despite a presumption of innocence in criminal
cases, expect that the government would not indict a case without
operating lawfully and within the bounds of ethical rules and norms.
Judges rely upon the accepted premise that the government has sufficient
lawfully-obtained evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consequently, those judges are less likely to question actions and
statements of government lawyers.
But perhaps the most fundamental question comparing these jurists is
129. WILLIAM KUNSTLER, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 205 (1994).
130. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 89.
131. Lefcourt, supra note 96.
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beyond the issue of courtroom control. The more significant one is the
courage of a judge in a highly politicized climate to question the actions
of the government, notably where the court’s conduct is carefully
scrutinized in the press and by the public.132
Historical context is important, and the analogue to the current
condition is overwhelming. Nixon was elected on a carefully crafted
platform of a “war on crime” and a “Southern Strategy,” designed to
appeal to the Southern former democrats. He was deeply paranoid about
the antiwar new left and the rising black militancy. He made it clear to
his underlings that he was not going to let “them” do to him what they
had done to L.B.J. Besides these motives, he was deeply committed to
expanding executive power.133
As William Bender, counsel in United States v. Ayers notes:
For a single federal judge to stand up to these forces and to adhere to
basic constitutional values is nothing short of remarkable, especially
given the governmental disapprobation and the political blow back.
Some of the press clippings and letters to the Judge certainly support
this. This was judicial courage at its best. It would have been so easy
for him to duck and avoid the showdowns in both cases.134

Is Judge Keith an anomaly on the bench? How does one explain his
principled, courageous and courteous conduct? While explanations for
judicial conduct are complex, Judge Jerome Frank noted that “‘the
personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration’ and
that his ‘political, economic and moral biases’ affect almost all of his
decisions.”135
Judge Keith, [a prominent African American judge], credits his judicial
vision [to his mentors and] to his student days at Howard. There, in the
company of Justice Marshall, Dean Houston, and many others,
Judge Keith came to accept the Constitution as a living document,
which he believes offers insight, and even prescription, for correcting
societal wrongs even if Congress is too weak or malevolent to act.136

Many have extolled Judge Keith’s virtues, his remarkable history of
significant accomplishments in law and in life that changed the course of
the United States. As the former president of Wayne State University
132. I have explored this issue in Ellen Yaroshefsky, Aspiring to a Model of the Engaged Judge,
74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. L. 393 (2019).
133. See DONNER, supra note 23, at 247.
134. E-mails from William Bender (June 7, 2018) (on file with author); E-mails from William
Bender (June 13, 2018) (on file with author); Bender, supra note 94.
135. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 85; see generally WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH
IT? (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (containing essays by legal scholars and political scientists
examining judicial conduct).
136. Cook, supra note 21, at 1175–76 (footnote omitted). See also HAMMER & COLEMAN,
supra note 21.
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wrote in the introduction to the book about Judge Keith’s life,
Judge Damon Keith is a giant. Every chapter of his life—as an active
citizen, a prominent lawyer, a celebrated judge, a profound thinker, and
a bold leader—is an eloquent testament to his passion for equality and
for his willingness to commit that passion to action. . . . Judge Keith
built a legacy as a fair and tenacious jurist unwilling to compromise on
our country’s most precious ideal—liberty and justice for all people.137

As Professor Blanche Cook noted:
Judge Keith has reached beyond the subjectivity of his own life to
create a more equitable world, particularly in situations involving
governmental abuse of power against its citizens and his adherence to
“equal justice under the law.” Even in the face of peril and political
pressure from the office of the presidency, Judge Keith . . . protect[ed]
the rights of every citizen from the government’s uninvited ear.138

Justice Stephen Breyer, in a tribute to Judge Keith said,
I cannot tell you just where, in his background, he learned to
combine so effectively “head” and “heart.” Perhaps that ability reflects,
in part, his own early experiences as the son of a Ford foundry worker,
where he learned, as he put it, about an auto worker’s need “to drag his
sore bones out of bed on a freezing January day to go off and feed his
family.” Perhaps, too, it reflects his experience of the evils of
segregation.139

Judges with backgrounds such as Judge Keith’s, whose judicial views
flow from upholding a living constitution, are not among the scores of
federal judges Donald Trump has appointed.140 It may be that judges akin
137. HAMMER & COLEMAN, supra note 21, at vii. The Walter Reuther Library at Wayne State
Law School has a Damon Keith collection. Its description of Judge Keith is:
Judge Damon Keith served in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judge Keith delivered
several landmark rulings in civil rights and civil liberties cases and played an active role
in various civic, cultural and educational associations, including the Detroit YMCA, the
United Negro College Fund, and the Detroit National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP). He is the recipient of the NAACP’s Springarn Medal, the
American Bar Association’s Thurgood Marshall Award, the Edward J. Devitt Award for
Distinguished Service to Justice, and over thirty honorary degrees. Judge Keith’s papers
document important milestones in his career, his precedent-setting judicial decisions, his
role in ensuring equal justice for all Americans, and the many honors and awards
bestowed upon him for his dedication to civil rights and to the City of Detroit.
Drice,
Damon
J.
Keith
Papers,
WAYNE
ST.
U.
(Sept.
3,
2010),
https://reuther.wayne.edu/node/2678.
138. Cook, supra note 21, at 1166. See generally id. (discussing a range of affirmative action,
civil rights cases as well as United States v. U.S. District Court).
139. Stephen Breyer, Tribute, 42 WAYNE L. REV. i (1996) (cited in Cook, supra note 21, at
1174 n.39).
140. A reorientation of the courts has begun. See Edward Whelan, Trump’s Stellar Judges, NAT.
REV. (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/01/22/trumpsstellar-judicial-nominations/; see also Joseph P. Williams, The Judicial Puppet Master, U.S. NEWS
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to Damon Keith will become more anomalous on the federal bench, but
there remains hope, at least on the state level, and to some extent on the
federal one, that his judicial philosophy, courage, and precedent will
serve as a beacon and inspiration to other jurists.
Overall, judges need to engage in greater reflection about their role,
their implicit biases, and their practices and sometimes take stances
outside their comfort zone. Judges should be exceedingly capable of
dodging controversy. They should judge in the narrowest sense, and this
thoughtfulness may provide the judicial branch with improved reputation
and stronger ability to take action when necessary.141 Judges must move
beyond such passive action and become more engaged judges to uphold
justice.142
CONCLUSION
Judge Keith’s conduct in United States v. Sinclair and United States v.
Ayers is testament to the importance of an independent judiciary.
Keith’s action . . . is a prime example of an independent federal
judge interposing his authority between an executive action and the
general citizenry. As the public now knows through the various
Watergate-released disclosures, the Nixon administration had grandiose
schemes for surveillance of domestic “enemies,” political and
otherwise; warrantless wiretapping of the sort used against [one of the
plaintiffs in Sinclair] was a key weapon. But Judge Damon Keith, a
jurist not answerable to a presidency which likened itself to a
“sovereign” had the courage to say “no” . . . .143

The strength of the judiciary is rooted in the courage and independence
displayed by Judge Damon Keith.

(Oct.
27,
2017,
6:00
AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/
2017-10-27/leonard-leo-is-calling-the-shots-on-judicial-appointments.
141. Nancy Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 N.W. L. REV. 423, 432 (2016).
142. Yaroshefsky, supra note 132.
143. GOULDEN, supra note 56, at 351.

